A Short Outline and Translation of:
Front Hum Neurosci. 2012; 6: 61.
Bilinçsiz muhakeme üzerinde yönetsel kontrol:bilinçsiz bilgi-işlemin
dikkatsel duyarlaştırması
Executive
control over unconscious cognition: attentional sensitization of unconscious
information processing
Department of Psychiatry, University of Ulm, Ulm,
GermanyEdited by: Nicola De Pisapia, University of Trento,
ItalyReviewed by: Bruno Breitmeyer, University of
Houston, USA; Heiko Reuss, Julius-Maximilians-University of Wuerzburg, Germany*Correspondence: Markus Kiefer, Department of
Psychiatry, Section for Cognitive Electrophysiology, University of Ulm,
Leimgrubenweg 12, Ulm 89075, Germany. e-mail: markus.kiefer@uni-ulm.de
Bilinçsiz süreçler kasıtlı niyet olmadan harekete
geçirilen otomatik süreçlerin tipik örneğidir(Posner and Snyder, 1975).
Unconscious processes are
prototypical examples of automatic processes, which are initiated without deliberate
intention (Posner and Snyder, 1975).
Klasik otomatiklik teorileri bu tür bilinçsiz otomatik
süreçlerin yönetsel kontrol mekanizmalarından bağımsız olarak tamamen en aşağıdan-yukarıya
şekilde oluştuğunu kabul eder.
Classical theories of automaticity assume that such unconscious automatic
processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent of executive
control mechanisms.
Bu klasik teorilere karşıt olarak, bilinçsiz bilgi
işleme ile ilgili dikkatsel duyarlaştırma modeli, bilinçsiz işleyişin yönetsel
kontrolün etkisine açık olduğunu ve, bunun yalnızca muhakemesel sistem ona
uygun şeklide kurulmuş ise mümkün olduğunu ileri sürer.
In contrast to these classical
theories, our attentional sensitization model of unconscious information
processing proposes that unconscious processing is susceptible to executive
control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly.
Bilinçaltı işleyiş görev kümelerinin bir işlevi olarak
görev ile ilişkili işlem yollarının dikkatsel güçlendirmesine dayanır.
It is assumed that unconscious
processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing
pathways as a function of task sets.
…
Dikkatsel duyarlaştırma modeli yönetsel kontrol
etkilerinin görsel-hareket ve anlamsal işleyiş alanlarında bilinçsiz muhakeme
etkilerini açıklar: Bilinçaltı
önkoşullama dikkatsel kaynaklara dayanır, uyarı beklentilerinin etkisine
açıktır ve eylem niyetlerince ve görev kümelerince etkilenir.
executive control influences on
unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing:
subliminal priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus
expectations and is influenced by action intentions and task sets.
Bilinçsiz işleyiş bile esnektir ve yüksek seviye
yönetsel kontrol tercihleri cinsinden bağlama bağımlıdır.
This suggests that even
unconscious processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of
higher-level executive control settings.
Bilinçsiz süreçleri ölçmek için önemli bir yöntem,
görülebilir hedefler üzerine sonradan gelen kararlar veya eylemler hakkında bilinçaltı(subliminal)
önkoşullayarak etkilemedir. Bu
bilinçaltı önkoşullamalar bilinçle
algılanmayan maskelenmiş görsel uyarılar ile oluşturulur.
An important method to measure
unconscious processes are subliminal priming (e.g., facilitatory) effects on
subsequent decisions or actions on visible targets, which are elicited by
masked visual stimuli that are not consciously perceived (Greenwald et al., 1996; Vorberg et al., 2003; Kiefer, 2007
…
Yapılan deneylerde, kullanılan uyarılar bilinçle
algılanamasa da çeşitli karışıklık düzeylerinde bu uyarıların muhakemesel
süreçleri tetiklediği gözlenmiştir ( Dehaene et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011; Ansorge et al., 2011b; Kunde et al., 2012).
Although these stimuli cannot be
consciously perceived, there are meanwhile numerous demonstrations that they trigger
cognitive processes at several levels of complexity and thus can influence
decisions and actions (for reviews see, Dehaene et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011; Ansorge et al., 2011b; Kunde et al., 2012).
…
Muhakemesel kontrolün klasik teorileri, bilinçli
süreçlerin kapasite açısından sınırlı dikkatsel kaynaklara dayandığını ileri
sürer ve bunlar yönetsel kontrol tarafından değiştirilebilir.
Classical theories of cognitive
control, therefore, propose that only conscious processes depend on
capacity-limited attentional resources and can be modulated by executive
control. …:
Yönetsel kontrol ve dikkatin bilinçli muhakeme alanı
ile iddia edilen ilişkisi son zamanlarda iki açıdan tartışılmaya başlamıştır.
(1)
Bilinçsiz
uyarı yönetsel kontrol ayarlarını etkiler.
Çok sayıda deney, bilinçaltı uyarıların seyir-konumsal (spatial) ve türselliğe(modality)
özel dikkat ile göreve özel işlemler ve görev kümelerinde kaymalara yol
açtığını göstermiştir (Ansorge et al., 2002; Scharlau and Ansorge, 2003) ve türselliğe özgü dikkat (Mattler, 2003, 2005) ve de göreve-özgü kontrol işlemleri (Mattler, 2003, 2005, 2006) and task sets (Reuss et al., 2011; Wokke et al., 2011).
(1)
Unconscious stimuli influence executive control
settings. Several experiments showed that subliminal stimuli can modulate
shifts of spatial (Ansorge et al., 2002; Scharlau and Ansorge, 2003) and modality-specific attention (Mattler, 2003, 2005) as well as task-specific control operations
(Mattler, 2003, 2005, 2006) and task sets (Reuss et al., 2011; Wokke et al., 2011).
(2) Dahası, yönetsel kontrol ve bilinçsiz
işleyiş arasında çift yönlü bir ilişki vardır çünkü dikkatsel kaynaklar, uyarı
beklentileri, eylem niyetleri, veya görev kümeleri gibi yukarıdan aşağıya
etkenler bilinçsiz uyarı işleyişini değiştirir (Jaśkowski et al., 2003; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Wokke et al., 2011).
(2) Furthermore, the relation between executive
control and unconscious processing is bidirectional because top-down factors
such as attentional resources, stimulus expectations, action intensions, or
task sets, all factors that are typically considered to involve executive
control mechanisms (Norman and Shallice, 1986), modulate unconscious stimulus processing (Jaśkowski et al., 2003; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Wokke et al., 2011). …
Otomatikliğin klasik teorisine karşıt arınmış hali
Classical versus refined theories of automaticity
Dahası, eğer bilinçsiz otomatik işleyiş bağlamdan
bağımsız olsaydı; bu muhakemesel sistemin olağanüstü esneksizliğine yol açardı(Kiefer and Martens, 2010):
if unconscious automatic processing were context-independent, this would
result in a tremendous inflexibility of the cognitive system (Kiefer and Martens, 2010):
Bilinçli hedefe-yönelik bilgi işleyiş çeşitli
bilinçsiz süreçler tarafından kütlesel bir şekilde etkilenirdi.
conscious goal-directed
information processing would be massively influenced by various unconscious
processes.
Bilinçli yönetsel kontrole ihtiyaç artardı, çünkü
niyetlenilen eylem yalnız bilinçsiz bilgi işleyişten kaynaklanan çok sayıda işe-karışıcı
yanıt eğilimlerini yasaklayarak gerçekleştirilebilir(Botvinick et al., 2001).
Demands on conscious executive control would
be increased, because the intended action could only be ensured by inhibiting
numerous interfering response tendencies induced by unconscious information
processing (Botvinick et al., 2001)
…
Doğrudan Değişken Tanımlama (DPS) bilinçsiz
bilginin yalnızca o andaki niyetlere uygun olduğu takdirde işleneceğini ve
hafif bir uyarıcıya verilen hareket yanıtını etkileyeceğini ileri sürer.
Neumann (1990) proposes in his theory of direct parameter specification (DPS) that
unconscious information will only be processed and will influence the motor
response to a target stimulus to the extent that it matches current intentions.
Benzer şekilde, Dehaene ve Naccache (2001)’nin global iş uzayı bilinçlilik modeli açıkça
bilinçsiz süreçlerin dikkatsel kuvvetlenmeye açık olduğunu kabul eder.
Similarly, the global workspace model of
consciousness by Dehaene and Naccache (2001) explicitly assumes that unconscious processes are susceptible to
attentional amplification.
Klasik teorilerin tersine, dikkat, niyetler, görev
kümeleri gibi yönetsel kontrol etkenleri bilinçsiz işleyiş akışlarını daha
yüksek görev başarısına doğru yönlendirir.
Unlike classical theories, refined theories
propose that executive control factors such as attention, intentions, and task
sets orchestrate the unconscious processing streams toward greater optimization
of task performance.
Muhakemesel sistemin bu
kesin yapılandırmasına bağlı olarak, ‘koşullu otomatiklik’ deyimi tanımlanmıştır(Bargh,
1989; Logan, 1989).
Given this dependency on the
precise configuration of the cognitive system, the term “conditional automaticity”
has been coined (Bargh, 1989; Logan, 1989).
Bilinçsiz muhakemenin dikkatsel duyarlılık modeli
The attentional sensitization
model of unconscious cognition
Görev kümelerinden kaynaklanan dikkatsel etkiler görev
ile ilgili bilinçsiz süreçleri tetikler, görev ile ilişkisiz süreçleri
bastırır.
It is proposed that attentional
influences originating from task sets enhance task-relevant unconscious
processes while attenuating task-irrelevant unconscious processes.
Görev kümeleri verilmiş bir görevi etkince icra etmek
için gerekli olan muhakemesel sistemin,
uyarlanabilir bir yapılanması olarak tanımlanır.
Task sets are defined as an
adaptive configuration of the cognitive system which is necessary to
efficiently perform a given task (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Kiesel et al., 2010).
Bilinçli algılamanın dikkatsel mekanizmalarının
etkilenmesi gibi, bilinçsiz muhakemenin, pre-frontal cortex’in yukarıdan
aşağıya işaretleri tarafından kontrol edildiği düşünülür. Bu işaretler, içeri gelen algısal işaretler
için
işlemsel patika yollarının duyarlılığını arttırır veya
azaltır.
Much as conscious perception is
influenced by attentional mechanisms, unconscious cognition is thought to be
controlled by top-down signals from prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007) that increase or decrease the sensitivity of processing pathways for
incoming sensory input (Hopfinger et al., 2000, 2001; Bode and Haynes, 2008).
Böylece, dikkatsel duyarlaştırma mekanizması, uyarının
bilinçli algılanmasından bağımsız olarak, uyarı işlenişini giderek geliştirir
ya da engeller.
Hence, the attentional
sensitizing mechanism is thought to gradually enhance and attenuate stimulus
processing irrespective of whether the stimulus is consciously perceived or not
(Kiefer and Martens, 2010).
Bilinçsiz ve bilinçli işleyişler temel bilgi-işlem
prensiplerini paylaşsalar da, bilinçli stratejik işleyiş bir çok açıdan daha
esnektir.
Although executive control of
both unconscious and conscious processing shares basic computational
principles, control of conscious strategic processing is more flexible in
several respects.
Yukarıdan aşağıya etkilerin uyarıya maruz kalmadan
önce başlatıldığı öncelikli kontrol, hem bilinçli hem bilinçsiz uyarı sunulduğunda uygulanabilir , oysa
yalnızca bilinçli algılanan uyarılar devam etmekte olan veya tamamlanmış uyarı
işleyişteki tepkisel kontrole açıktır.
Preemptive control, in which
top-down influences are initiated in advance of stimulus presentation, can be
exerted for both conscious and unconscious stimulus presentation, whereas only
consciously perceived stimuli are susceptible to reactive control in response
to ongoing or completed stimulus processing (Ansorge and Horstmann, 2007; Kiefer, 2007; Ansorge et al., 2009, 2011a; Kiefer and Martens, 2010).
Bilinçsiz bilgi işleyişin yönetsel kontrolü bilinçaltı
ayarlanmaları, bir yanıt ya da öncül olarak ve bilerek gerçekleşemez çünkü
tanım olarak bireyler onların farkında değildir.
Executive control of unconscious
information processing cannot be exerted intentionally in anticipation or
response to subliminal stimuli themselves because individuals are not aware of
them by definition.
Yönetsel kontrol, kontrol değerlerinin ayarlanmasına
yol açan açık davranışın bilinçli
sonucuna dayandırılabilir.
Executive control can also be
based on the consciously perceived outcome of overt behavior, which leads to an
adjustment of control settings (Jaśkowski et al., 2003).
Aynı zamanda dikkatsel veya görsel ipuçları gibi
bilinçaltı uyarıları tarafından bilinçsizce tetiklenebilir.
but can also be unconsciously
triggered by subliminal stimuli such as attentional or task cues (e.g., Ansorge
et al., 2002; Mattler, 2005; Reuss et al., 2011).
Yine de bilinçsiz bölgedeki yönetsel kontrol,
öncelikli olduğu için, muhakemesel kontrolü tetikleyen ya da değiştiren
bilinçaltı uyarıların ilgili bilinçsiz süreç gelmeden önce sunulması gerekir.
However, as executive control in
the unconscious domain is preemptive, subliminal stimuli that trigger or modify
cognitive control settings must be presented before the unconscious process of
interest is elicited (e.g., by a subliminal prime).
Sonuç olarak, bilinçsiz işleyişin yönetsel kontrolü
kolaylaştırıcı etkileri temel alır yani farksal dikkat duyarlılığına
dayanır. Görev ile ilişkisiz bilginin
aktif yasaklanması bilinçli algılanan uyarıların kontrollü işlenişinden
ibarettir..
Finally, executive control of
unconscious processing is presumably based on facilitatory influences, that is,
it depends on differential attentional sensitization, whereas active inhibition
of task-irrelevant information appears to be confined to controlled processing
of consciously perceived stimuli (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Neely, 1977; Merikle et al., 1995).
Böylece, stratejik duyarlaştırma modeli yönetsel
kontrolün daha fazla uyarlanabilirlik ve esnekliğinin kabulüne imkan tanır.
Thus, according to the
attentional sensitization model conscious stimulus processing, which is
traditionally considered to be “strategic,” allows for a greater adaptability
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