Thursday, May 16, 2013

Bilinçsiz muhakeme üzerinde yönetsel kontrol

A Short Outline and Translation of:

Front Hum Neurosci. 2012; 6: 61.
Bilinçsiz muhakeme üzerinde yönetsel kontrol:bilinçsiz bilgi-işlemin dikkatsel duyarlaştırması
Executive control over unconscious cognition: attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing

Department of Psychiatry, University of Ulm, Ulm, GermanyEdited by: Nicola De Pisapia, University of Trento, ItalyReviewed by: Bruno Breitmeyer, University of Houston, USA; Heiko Reuss, Julius-Maximilians-University of Wuerzburg, Germany*Correspondence: Markus Kiefer, Department of Psychiatry, Section for Cognitive Electrophysiology, University of Ulm, Leimgrubenweg 12, Ulm 89075, Germany. e-mail: markus.kiefer@uni-ulm.de
Abstract
Bilinçsiz süreçler kasıtlı niyet olmadan harekete geçirilen otomatik süreçlerin tipik örneğidir(Posner and Snyder, 1975).
Unconscious processes are prototypical examples of automatic processes, which are initiated without deliberate intention (Posner and Snyder, 1975).

Klasik otomatiklik teorileri bu tür bilinçsiz otomatik süreçlerin yönetsel kontrol mekanizmalarından bağımsız olarak tamamen en aşağıdan-yukarıya şekilde oluştuğunu kabul eder.
Classical theories of automaticity assume that such unconscious automatic processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent of executive control mechanisms.

Bu klasik teorilere karşıt olarak, bilinçsiz bilgi işleme ile ilgili dikkatsel duyarlaştırma modeli, bilinçsiz işleyişin yönetsel kontrolün etkisine açık olduğunu ve, bunun yalnızca muhakemesel sistem ona uygun şeklide kurulmuş ise mümkün olduğunu ileri sürer.
In contrast to these classical theories, our attentional sensitization model of unconscious information processing proposes that unconscious processing is susceptible to executive control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly.

Bilinçaltı işleyiş görev kümelerinin bir işlevi olarak görev ile ilişkili işlem yollarının dikkatsel güçlendirmesine dayanır.
 It is assumed that unconscious processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways as a function of task sets.

Dikkatsel duyarlaştırma modeli yönetsel kontrol etkilerinin görsel-hareket ve anlamsal işleyiş alanlarında bilinçsiz muhakeme etkilerini açıklar:  Bilinçaltı önkoşullama dikkatsel kaynaklara dayanır, uyarı beklentilerinin etkisine açıktır ve eylem niyetlerince ve görev kümelerince etkilenir.
executive control influences on unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing: subliminal priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and is influenced by action intentions and task sets.

Bilinçsiz işleyiş bile esnektir ve yüksek seviye yönetsel kontrol tercihleri cinsinden bağlama bağımlıdır.
This suggests that even unconscious processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of higher-level executive control settings.
 
Giriş
Introduction
Bilinçsiz süreçleri ölçmek için önemli bir yöntem, görülebilir hedefler üzerine sonradan gelen kararlar veya eylemler hakkında bilinçaltı(subliminal) önkoşullayarak etkilemedir.  Bu bilinçaltı  önkoşullamalar bilinçle algılanmayan maskelenmiş görsel uyarılar ile oluşturulur.
An important method to measure unconscious processes are subliminal priming (e.g., facilitatory) effects on subsequent decisions or actions on visible targets, which are elicited by masked visual stimuli that are not consciously perceived (Greenwald et al., 1996; Vorberg et al., 2003; Kiefer, 2007

Yapılan deneylerde, kullanılan uyarılar bilinçle algılanamasa da çeşitli karışıklık düzeylerinde bu uyarıların muhakemesel süreçleri tetiklediği gözlenmiştir ( Dehaene et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011; Ansorge et al., 2011b; Kunde et al., 2012).
Although these stimuli cannot be consciously perceived, there are meanwhile numerous demonstrations that they trigger cognitive processes at several levels of complexity and thus can influence decisions and actions (for reviews see, Dehaene et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011; Ansorge et al., 2011b; Kunde et al., 2012).

Muhakemesel kontrolün klasik teorileri, bilinçli süreçlerin kapasite açısından sınırlı dikkatsel kaynaklara dayandığını ileri sürer ve bunlar yönetsel kontrol tarafından değiştirilebilir.
Classical theories of cognitive control, therefore, propose that only conscious processes depend on capacity-limited attentional resources and can be modulated by executive control. …:

Yönetsel kontrol ve dikkatin bilinçli muhakeme alanı ile iddia edilen ilişkisi son zamanlarda iki açıdan tartışılmaya başlamıştır.
(1)     Bilinçsiz uyarı yönetsel kontrol ayarlarını etkiler.  Çok sayıda deney, bilinçaltı uyarıların seyir-konumsal (spatial) ve türselliğe(modality) özel dikkat ile göreve özel işlemler ve görev kümelerinde kaymalara yol açtığını göstermiştir (Ansorge et al., 2002; Scharlau and Ansorge, 2003) ve türselliğe özgü dikkat  (Mattler, 2003, 2005) ve de göreve-özgü kontrol işlemleri (Mattler, 2003, 2005, 2006) and task sets (Reuss et al., 2011; Wokke et al., 2011).
(1)     Unconscious stimuli influence executive control settings. Several experiments showed that subliminal stimuli can modulate shifts of spatial (Ansorge et al., 2002; Scharlau and Ansorge, 2003) and modality-specific attention (Mattler, 2003, 2005) as well as task-specific control operations (Mattler, 2003, 2005, 2006) and task sets (Reuss et al., 2011; Wokke et al., 2011).

(2)  Dahası, yönetsel kontrol ve bilinçsiz işleyiş arasında çift yönlü bir ilişki vardır çünkü dikkatsel kaynaklar, uyarı beklentileri, eylem niyetleri, veya görev kümeleri gibi yukarıdan aşağıya etkenler bilinçsiz uyarı işleyişini değiştirir (Jaśkowski et al., 2003; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Wokke et al., 2011).
(2) Furthermore, the relation between executive control and unconscious processing is bidirectional because top-down factors such as attentional resources, stimulus expectations, action intensions, or task sets, all factors that are typically considered to involve executive control mechanisms (Norman and Shallice, 1986), modulate unconscious stimulus processing (Jaśkowski et al., 2003; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Wokke et al., 2011). …

Otomatikliğin klasik teorisine karşıt arınmış hali
Classical versus refined theories of automaticity

Dahası, eğer bilinçsiz otomatik işleyiş bağlamdan bağımsız olsaydı; bu muhakemesel sistemin olağanüstü esneksizliğine yol açardı(Kiefer and Martens, 2010):
if unconscious automatic processing were context-independent, this would result in a tremendous inflexibility of the cognitive system (Kiefer and Martens, 2010):

Bilinçli hedefe-yönelik bilgi işleyiş çeşitli bilinçsiz süreçler tarafından kütlesel bir şekilde etkilenirdi.
conscious goal-directed information processing would be massively influenced by various unconscious processes.

Bilinçli yönetsel kontrole ihtiyaç artardı, çünkü niyetlenilen eylem yalnız bilinçsiz bilgi işleyişten kaynaklanan çok sayıda işe-karışıcı yanıt eğilimlerini yasaklayarak gerçekleştirilebilir(Botvinick et al., 2001).
 Demands on conscious executive control would be increased, because the intended action could only be ensured by inhibiting numerous interfering response tendencies induced by unconscious information processing (Botvinick et al., 2001)

Doğrudan Değişken Tanımlama (DPS) bilinçsiz bilginin yalnızca o andaki niyetlere uygun olduğu takdirde işleneceğini ve hafif bir uyarıcıya verilen hareket yanıtını etkileyeceğini ileri sürer.
 Neumann (1990) proposes in his theory of direct parameter specification (DPS) that unconscious information will only be processed and will influence the motor response to a target stimulus to the extent that it matches current intentions.

Benzer şekilde, Dehaene ve Naccache (2001)’nin global iş uzayı bilinçlilik modeli açıkça bilinçsiz süreçlerin dikkatsel kuvvetlenmeye açık olduğunu kabul eder.
 Similarly, the global workspace model of consciousness by Dehaene and Naccache (2001) explicitly assumes that unconscious processes are susceptible to attentional amplification.

Klasik teorilerin tersine, dikkat, niyetler, görev kümeleri gibi yönetsel kontrol etkenleri bilinçsiz işleyiş akışlarını daha yüksek görev başarısına doğru yönlendirir.
 Unlike classical theories, refined theories propose that executive control factors such as attention, intentions, and task sets orchestrate the unconscious processing streams toward greater optimization of task performance.

 Muhakemesel sistemin bu kesin yapılandırmasına bağlı olarak, ‘koşullu otomatiklik’ deyimi tanımlanmıştır(Bargh, 1989; Logan, 1989).
Given this dependency on the precise configuration of the cognitive system, the term “conditional automaticity” has been coined (Bargh, 1989; Logan, 1989).
 
Bilinçsiz muhakemenin dikkatsel duyarlılık modeli
The attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition

Görev kümelerinden kaynaklanan dikkatsel etkiler görev ile ilgili bilinçsiz süreçleri tetikler, görev ile ilişkisiz süreçleri bastırır.
It is proposed that attentional influences originating from task sets enhance task-relevant unconscious processes while attenuating task-irrelevant unconscious processes.

Görev kümeleri verilmiş bir görevi etkince icra etmek için gerekli olan  muhakemesel sistemin, uyarlanabilir bir yapılanması olarak tanımlanır.
Task sets are defined as an adaptive configuration of the cognitive system which is necessary to efficiently perform a given task (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Kiesel et al., 2010).

Bilinçli algılamanın dikkatsel mekanizmalarının etkilenmesi gibi, bilinçsiz muhakemenin, pre-frontal cortex’in yukarıdan aşağıya işaretleri tarafından kontrol edildiği düşünülür.  Bu işaretler, içeri gelen algısal işaretler için
işlemsel patika yollarının duyarlılığını arttırır veya azaltır.
Much as conscious perception is influenced by attentional mechanisms, unconscious cognition is thought to be controlled by top-down signals from prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007) that increase or decrease the sensitivity of processing pathways for incoming sensory input (Hopfinger et al., 2000, 2001; Bode and Haynes, 2008).

Böylece, dikkatsel duyarlaştırma mekanizması, uyarının bilinçli algılanmasından bağımsız olarak, uyarı işlenişini giderek geliştirir ya da engeller.
Hence, the attentional sensitizing mechanism is thought to gradually enhance and attenuate stimulus processing irrespective of whether the stimulus is consciously perceived or not (Kiefer and Martens, 2010).

Bilinçsiz ve bilinçli işleyişler temel bilgi-işlem prensiplerini paylaşsalar da, bilinçli stratejik işleyiş bir çok açıdan daha esnektir.
Although executive control of both unconscious and conscious processing shares basic computational principles, control of conscious strategic processing is more flexible in several respects.

Yukarıdan aşağıya etkilerin uyarıya maruz kalmadan önce başlatıldığı öncelikli kontrol, hem bilinçli hem bilinçsiz  uyarı sunulduğunda uygulanabilir , oysa yalnızca bilinçli algılanan uyarılar devam etmekte olan veya tamamlanmış uyarı işleyişteki tepkisel kontrole açıktır.
Preemptive control, in which top-down influences are initiated in advance of stimulus presentation, can be exerted for both conscious and unconscious stimulus presentation, whereas only consciously perceived stimuli are susceptible to reactive control in response to ongoing or completed stimulus processing (Ansorge and Horstmann, 2007; Kiefer, 2007; Ansorge et al., 2009, 2011a; Kiefer and Martens, 2010).

Bilinçsiz bilgi işleyişin yönetsel kontrolü bilinçaltı ayarlanmaları, bir yanıt ya da öncül olarak ve bilerek gerçekleşemez çünkü tanım olarak bireyler onların farkında değildir.
Executive control of unconscious information processing cannot be exerted intentionally in anticipation or response to subliminal stimuli themselves because individuals are not aware of them by definition.

Yönetsel kontrol, kontrol değerlerinin ayarlanmasına yol açan  açık davranışın bilinçli sonucuna dayandırılabilir.
Executive control can also be based on the consciously perceived outcome of overt behavior, which leads to an adjustment of control settings (Jaśkowski et al., 2003).

Aynı zamanda dikkatsel veya görsel ipuçları gibi bilinçaltı uyarıları tarafından bilinçsizce tetiklenebilir.
but can also be unconsciously triggered by subliminal stimuli such as attentional or task cues (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2002; Mattler, 2005; Reuss et al., 2011).

Yine de bilinçsiz bölgedeki yönetsel kontrol, öncelikli olduğu için, muhakemesel kontrolü tetikleyen ya da değiştiren bilinçaltı uyarıların ilgili bilinçsiz süreç gelmeden önce sunulması gerekir.
However, as executive control in the unconscious domain is preemptive, subliminal stimuli that trigger or modify cognitive control settings must be presented before the unconscious process of interest is elicited (e.g., by a subliminal prime).

Sonuç olarak, bilinçsiz işleyişin yönetsel kontrolü kolaylaştırıcı etkileri temel alır yani farksal dikkat duyarlılığına dayanır.  Görev ile ilişkisiz bilginin aktif yasaklanması bilinçli algılanan uyarıların kontrollü işlenişinden ibarettir..
Finally, executive control of unconscious processing is presumably based on facilitatory influences, that is, it depends on differential attentional sensitization, whereas active inhibition of task-irrelevant information appears to be confined to controlled processing of consciously perceived stimuli (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Neely, 1977; Merikle et al., 1995).

Böylece, stratejik duyarlaştırma modeli yönetsel kontrolün daha fazla uyarlanabilirlik ve esnekliğinin kabulüne imkan tanır.
Thus, according to the attentional sensitization model conscious stimulus processing, which is traditionally considered to be “strategic,” allows for a greater adaptability and flexibility of executive control.

 

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